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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1978

Frank Moore

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
your information.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1978

4:55 p.m.

great!
J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

FRANK MOORE

f.m./p.d.

FYI, NO ACTION REQUIRED.

The House Energy Conferees will complete their work within the next 30 minutes (by 5:30 p.m. this evening). We are assured the votes for passage of the compromise.

The House Conferees are scheduled to meet with the Senate Conferees tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. in order to present the House proposal.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1978

Stu Eizenstat
Jim McIntyre

The attached was returned in the
President's outbox today and
is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1978

C
/

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*
JIM McINTYRE *Jim*

SUBJECT: Organization of International Aviation
Policy and Negotiations

Last March, Secretary Adams sent you a memorandum asking you to assign leadership responsibility for international air transportation matters to the Secretary of Transportation. Today these matters are conducted by an interagency committee chaired by the State Department.

You decided to defer making a final decision until the issue was thoroughly reviewed. You asked us to work with the agencies and either reach a consensus or provide you with a statement of options.

We have reached a consensus on some issues, but a serious disagreement remains. This memorandum brings for your review the consensus that has been reached, and the options for the disagreement that remains.

The agencies involved helped prepare this document and agree that it is an accurate and complete statement of their views.

The Issues in International Aviation Organization

There are three parts to the government's conduct of international aviation:

1. Formulation of long-range policy;
2. Development of positions and strategy for negotiations with individual countries; and
3. The actual face-to-face negotiations with foreign governments.

-2-

Issues on Which a Consensus Has Been Reached

A consensus has been reached on issues (1) and (3).

Issue 1: Long-range Policy. There is today no formal structure for the development of long-range aviation policy. The concerned agencies -- State, Transportation, CAB, Justice, Commerce, OMB, Domestic Policy Staff, NSC -- have recently agreed on a new, pro-competitive international aviation policy statement. OMB coordinated the process of incorporating all agencies' views, but no single agency took the lead.

The policy statement will be released for public comment this week. After it is commented upon, we will submit it to you for final approval.

Secretary Adams recommends that the Department of Transportation should have the leadership responsibility for long-range policy development within the Executive Branch. In performing this role DOT would closely coordinate with the Departments of State and Justice, the CAB, and other agencies.

All agencies concur in Secretary Adams' recommendation.

Agree ☒

Disagree ☐

Issue 3: Actual negotiations with foreign governments. Today we are negotiating many air services agreements with foreign governments. The State Department conducts the actual face-to-face negotiations with foreign governments in accordance with instructions from the interagency committee described in the next section. All agencies, including DOT, agree that the State Department should continue to be the actual negotiator.

Agree ☒

Disagree ☐

Issue 2: Options on the Organization for Development of Positions and Strategy for Negotiations with Individual Countries. This is the only issue on which there is agency disagreement.

Because there is basic agreement among agencies about our long-range policy, and because we are renegotiating many of our air services agreements with foreign governments, this is the most important aspect of our international aviation policy.

Some examples of the issues involved in this function are:

- which countries and issues should be given priority;
- our negotiating objectives for each country;
- whether concessions in our basic policy should be made in order to conclude an agreement with a foreign country.

At this time the function is performed by an interagency committee chaired by the State Department. Three agencies -- State, Transportation, and the CAB -- participate with an equal voice. Decisions of the interagency committee are made by consensus. If there is disagreement among the three principals (State, DOT, CAB), the dissenter is generally willing to yield to the judgment of the majority. Other agencies who participate in the meetings include the Departments of Justice and Commerce, OMB, NSC, and the Domestic Policy Staff.

As chairman, the State Department is responsible for the coordination and development of positions and strategies for negotiations. The State Department convenes meetings of the interagency committee when an important decision must be made.

OPTION 1

Secretary Adams recommends that international aviation negotiations be treated primarily as matters of transportation policy. He wants the Department of Transportation to replace the State Department as Chairman of the interagency committee.

1. As Chairman, DOT would be responsible for coordination and formulation of the transportation policy positions. International aviation policy would be considered primarily as transportation policy. As such, DOT would be given lead responsibility for coordinating policy in this area.
2. The State Department would participate as a principal in the development of policy and strategies for negotiations. On matters of foreign policy, the State Department would be able to override other agencies on the committee.

3. The CAB, as an independent regulatory agency, would play an advisory role. However, the CAB would not be an equal partner in setting broad transportation policy for U.S. executive agreements with foreign countries, as it is now.
4. If there are disagreements on other than foreign policy issues, then DOT would attempt to develop a consensus. Each agency would, however, retain the right of appeal to the President. On foreign policy issues, the State Department's determination would be binding.

Secretary Adams' reasons for this recommendation are:

1. Transportation policy coordination responsibility should rest with the Secretary of Transportation, who can best evaluate both substantive and political ramifications of various international aviation actions.
2. Today there is a lack of clear assignment of policy and management responsibility in this area. Resolution of issues is delayed by the absence of an identifiable U.S. international air policy spokesman. The interagency group chaired by the State Department has been cumbersome and has not effectively provided for resolution of interagency disagreements.
3. A major failure in the present interagency setup for handling negotiating priorities and strategies lies in the domination of day-to-day issues in the international aviation policymaking process. The interagency group is so involved in the pressing business of current negotiations and related problems that it has not been able to develop medium or longer-term strategies for action. DOT believes that continuation of the fragmented responsibility for long-term policy development (in DOT) and short-term policy development and implementation (in a committee or in the Department of State) will make it difficult for the U.S. to act as an effective world aviation policy leader.
4. The Secretary of Transportation should be the focal point for U.S. international aviation policy. There is a rationale for assignment of policy

development and implementation responsibilities to DOT, and actual negotiating responsibilities to State. This will assure both continuity and focus in the policy area and is a logical division of organizational responsibilities. DOT would be held responsible for success or failure in implementing international air policy. State would concentrate its effort in the areas in which they have a special competence -- foreign policy and conduct of negotiations.

5. Assignment of the policy coordination function to DOT would allow a clearer and more effective communication of U.S. international air policy views to foreign governments, to the public and the press, and to the international aviation community. Outside parties will have a clear perception of the lines of responsibility in the Executive Branch. This will provide more rapid achievement of agreed U.S. international air policy objectives.
6. In many other countries, the Transport Ministers hold primary responsibility for international air transport matters. The Secretary of Transportation deals directly with his foreign counterparts on many transportation issues. Our awkward administrative arrangements make it difficult to act decisively on air transportation issues.
7. Your decision to appoint Alan Boyd as a special ambassador to lead the 1977 U.S.-U.K. negotiations was an illustration of the awkwardness of the existing committee. Secretary Adams and Alan Boyd worked with you directly and with the committee to reach a fair agreement with the U.K. in such a way as to prevent any political embarrassment to Prime Minister Callaghan. The result, Bermuda II, was not all we wanted, but was the best we could obtain at the time.

OPTION 2

The Departments of State and Justice, the CAB, and NSC disagree with Secretary Adams. They would like to continue the existing system in which the Department of State chairs the interagency committee, and CAB, State and DOT have an equal voice.

Their reasons for continuing the existing system and recommending against Secretary Adams' request are:

1. The existing system is working smoothly, and has successfully negotiated the recent pro-competitive agreements. The one recent negotiation in which the existing structure was bypassed was Bermuda II, and the results were not satisfactory. In contrast, a State-led interagency effort was able in March to conclude a low-fares and charter agreement with the U.K. to substantially offset the restrictive aspects of Bermuda II. A shift from State to DOT as the lead agency would be viewed as backsliding on our pro-competitive policy.
2. Separating the policy-coordination function from the negotiating function would weaken the State Department's negotiating posture, as well as exacerbate the problems of accountability and confusion. Foreign governments would give less credence to our negotiators if they knew that a different agency has responsibility for policy positions. Strong negotiating positions will be ignored, as foreign governments attempt to "appeal over State's head" to DOT. State's credibility as the U.S. negotiator will be destroyed. Further, the bifurcation of functions advocated by DOT is inconsistent with its claims that clarity and accountability require a centralization of responsibility.
3. The Department of State is more capable of considering and coordinating the various views of all the interested agencies. Compared with DOT, State is:

- trusted more by the various agencies to be evenhanded,
 - more independent of the various special interest groups in this area,
 - better able to resist congressional pressures to blunt or distort our international aviation policy,
 - less inclined to be an advocate of a particular policy bias.
4. The existing arrangement is the only feasible way of giving all the governmental interests involved an equal role in planning the strategies for individual negotiations, and working together while the negotiations are under way. It recognizes the statutory roles and interests of various agencies by having each view presented and discussed through informal consultations and meetings, with decisions being made by mutual agreement. In particular, exclusion of the CAB from full participation as a principal would interfere with our ability to coordinate Board actions with our negotiating strategies and diminish the contributions of an aggressive, pro-competitive board.
5. DOT's criticisms of the interagency structure are largely unfounded or the result of their own actions. For example, delays and confusion have at times been caused by DOT's failure to commit itself at interagency meetings or in delegations. DOT has also generated the existing "confusion" on leadership, by going directly to the press and even to foreign governments with uncoordinated statements or criticisms on pending negotiations. This can be cured by a firm Presidential statement on allocation of responsibility for our international negotiations.
6. The Department of State should be in a position to coordinate all aspects of our foreign policy, of which international aviation is only one part. While it is true that other governments sometimes give more authority to their Ministers of Transport, the U.S. Government has consistently placed responsibility for all foreign relations with the Department of State.

Our recommendation is that you select Option 2 and continue the Department of State as the chairman of the interagency negotiating committee. State, Justice and the CAB in an effort to reach a consensus, have agreed to support DOT's assumption of leadership for long-range policy development within the Executive Branch. This change will provide a clearly identifiable focal point for developing and explaining the Administration's overall policy objectives in this area. Those agencies have also accommodated DOT's views and changed their previous opposition to the release of the international aviation policy statement for further public comment.

We concur in the reasons given by the agencies in support of Option 2. In particular we would like to emphasize three points:

1. In this area there is an unavoidable need for close cooperation and coordination between a number of agencies. We believe the interagency committee chaired by State is the best forum for hearing and fairly considering the views of all interested agencies. No matter what responsibility DOT offers to assume, success or failure in those negotiations cannot be attributed to any one agency.
2. There is little to distinguish international aviation from other foreign policy issues in which extensive interagency coordination is needed. The State Department cannot take a back seat to DOT in this area without establishing a bad precedent in other areas.
3. We think an interagency group chaired by State with strong participation by CAB will result in a more effective and aggressive negotiating effort to achieve the Administration's pro-competitive policies.

-9-

DECISION

Approve OPTION 1

(DOT recommends)

Approve OPTION 2

 ✓
(State, CAB, Justice, NSC and
we recommend)

JO

PRIOR MEMOS ON
SAME SUBJECT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE CYRUS VANCE
THE HONORABLE GRIFFIN BELL
THE HONORABLE BROCK ADAMS
THE HONORABLE ALFRED KAHN
THE HONORABLE JAMES MCINTYRE
THE HONORABLE STUART EIZENSTAT
THE HONORABLE ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Secretary Adams has raised some important questions about the organization of our international aviation negotiations which need to be resolved.

In accordance with my decision last fall to evaluate this process carefully, I want you to analyze the specific concerns of Secretary Adams and come up with a consensus or options for me on how best to organize international aviation activities. Such recommendations should include ways to improve the existing interagency committee, or to substitute a new mechanism for it.

Please report to me by May 15 on the outcome of your review.

J.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Susan
retype*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE CYRUS VANCE
THE HONORABLE GRIFFIN BELL
THE HONORABLE BROCK ADAMS
THE HONORABLE ALFRED KAHN
THE HONORABLE JAMES MC INTYRE
THE HONORABLE STUART EIZENSTAT
THE HONORABLE ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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*analyze the specific concerns of
Secretary
Adams and*

Please report to me by May 15 on the outcome of your review.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *He 25.*

SUBJECT: Conduct of International Air Transport
Negotiations

Brock Adams has sent you a memo recommending the reassignment of leadership responsibility for international air transportation matters from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Transportation.

This memorandum summarizes Brock's recommendation and the reactions of other agencies. In our view, you should not act on Adams' recommendation at this time. Instead, you should direct us to proceed with an interagency review of organizational issues in the aviation area to which you agreed last October.

Currently, international aviation negotiations are conducted by an interagency committee chaired by State. Three agencies--State, Transportation (DOT), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)--participate with an equal vote. If there is disagreement, the majority view prevails. State conducts the actual negotiations. Other agencies consulted on a regular basis include Justice, Commerce, OMB, NSC and the Domestic Policy Staff.

This arrangement has been in effect since the Bermuda II agreement was concluded last year. In October, you directed the agencies to complete a proposed international air policy statement and to recommend a permanent mechanism for the conduct of international aviation negotiations. The agencies will complete the policy statement this month, but work on the organizational issues has not yet begun.

Secretary Adams' Recommendation

Adams recommends that you assign him leadership responsibilities for international aviation. He believes that the interagency committee "simply is not working." He asserts that "we will continue to flounder around in the air policy

area until we identify the central issues as transportation policy issues rather than foreign policy issues"

Adams gives the following reasons to support his recommendation:

1. He is concerned about the "lack of clear assignment of policy and management responsibility" within the Executive Branch. Resolution of issues is delayed by the absence of an air policy spokesman. The interagency group has been "cumbersome in its operation and has not effectively provided for resolution of interagency disagreements."
2. Transportation policy decisions should rest with the Secretary of Transportation, who is in a position to evaluate the substantive and political ramifications of various international aviation actions. This is in line with a recent GAO report which concluded that DOT should be the focal point for aviation policy.
3. State's role should be limited. "If there are foreign policy reasons for changing or modifying a stated transportation policy, then the State Department's role should be to deal with those foreign policy reasons and to justify why they feel that such reasons should override the transportation policy basis for a position." State would, however, conduct most of the negotiations.
4. CAB's role should also be more limited than at present. (CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn attends all interagency meetings, and is playing a major role in international aviation policy.) "We must have the Board available for its particular technical expertise in ratemaking and other economic regulatory matters that are strictly within their province. But I would seriously question the extent to which they should be involved in setting broad transportation policy for Executive Agreements."

Agency Comments

State. Cy Vance disagrees. He believes that the inter-agency group is working well. Under State Department leadership, the U.S. has successfully resolved the recent fares dispute with the U.K. and negotiated the Dutch and Mexican agreements, the most pro-competitive agreements this country has ever signed.

Vance argues that State is "best qualified to coordinate our negotiating positions by virtue of its expertise in international negotiations, its direct lines to embassies abroad, and its ability to maximize U.S. aviation advantages by placing aviation in the larger context of U.S. international interests." The countries with which we must negotiate also view aviation from an overall foreign policy perspective and pursue their negotiating objectives as part of their overall foreign policy goals.

Vance notes that in the interagency meetings DOT representatives have not expressed the dissatisfaction raised in the memo. "Brock presents no convincing argument" against the foreign policy justification for State leadership.

Vance recommends that State continue to chair the interagency group and that you adhere to your decision of last fall to "conduct an orderly interagency review . . . rather than to rush to a decision on the basis of an unexpected initiative from Secretary Adams"

CAB. CAB Chairman Kahn says that adopting Adams' recommendation would be a serious mistake, in terms of achieving your goals of international aviation policy, goals which he emphatically supports. He argues that:

1. "The solution to the inadequacies in our present conduct of international aviation policy is not simply to transfer the leadership in this effort from one Executive Department to another, but to improve the machinery for interagency collaboration."
2. It is specifically undesirable to transfer the leadership from State to DOT. We are far more likely to get the breadth of perspective and the attachment to liberal competitive economic principles from State than from DOT. "Transportation men" tend to be cartel-minded. They tend to approach international negotiations as though their principal responsibility is to bargain for traffic rights on behalf of incumbent carriers rather than to increase the competitive price and service options offered to consumers.
3. Shifting responsibility to the Department of Transportation would remove State, the CAB, and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division from effective participation. Adams specifically argues that the roles of the State Department and the CAB should be limited. Kahn points out that the interagency group functions well and has direct and active participation by all agencies at a high level.

OMB. OMB believes that the interagency group as now constituted is performing well. State has assured participation by all key agencies. It is not clear how DOT leadership would improve the process significantly.

Jim McIntyre recommends that you "delay a decision on this issue." DOT should precisely state the shortcomings of the present setup and propose a specific alternative.

Justice. The Antitrust Division also disagrees with Adams' recommendation. The current arrangement works fairly well and "to the extent the perception exists that DOT is currently less pro-competitive than the CAB, adoption of the DOT recommendation would send the wrong signal on the Administration's commitment to aviation regulatory reform."

Our Recommendation

Brock Adams does raise some legitimate questions about the conduct of aviation negotiations with foreign countries. However, we do not believe that you should reassign leadership responsibility for international aviation on the basis of that memo alone. As the other agencies indicate, Adams does not point to specific problems caused by the present system, nor does he show how assigning responsibility to him would overcome those problems. He also does not make it clear what the nature of his new role would be, and the respective roles he intends for State and the CAB. We agree with recommendations by Cy Vance and other agencies that you stick by your decision to conduct an orderly interagency review of the issue.

If you agree, we recommend that you send the attached memo to Secretaries Vance and Adams, Chairman Kahn, and the Department of Justice.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/17/78

Mr. President:

Frank Moore and Jack Watson
had no comment.

OMB's comments are similar to those of Eizenstat/Brzezinski. McIntyre recommends that you delay a decision; require DOT to spell out more precisely the shortcomings of the present setup & propose specific alternatives; and give affected agencies time to comment on "a well-reasoned DOT proposal."

Rick




THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

March 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary
FROM: Brock Adams
SUBJECT: International Air Transport Negotiations

Two handwritten signatures are present. The first signature, 'Rick Hutcheson', is written over the 'THROUGH' line. The second signature, 'Brock Adams', is written over the 'FROM' line.

I am very concerned about the lack of clear assignment of policy and management responsibility for international air transportation within the Executive Branch. Today, the roles of the Departments of Transportation and State, and the Civil Aeronautics Board, are not clear. This has led to difficulty in the development and implementation of international air transportation policy, particularly with respect to the negotiation of air agreements with other nations.

You will remember a year ago I recommended to you that we have Alan Boyd act as Ambassador in negotiating the Bermuda 2 Agreement with the British. This arrangement was necessary because the British had served notice of termination of the old Agreement, and six months had gone by with American negotiators arguing amongst themselves. No progress was made until you appointed Alan Boyd.

While this device for focusing leadership worked in the negotiations with the United Kingdom, it was a temporary expedient that we agreed was undesirable to continue. We need to develop a better way to manage these international air policy issues without creating a new organizational entity in the Executive Branch. I believe we will continue to flounder around in the air policy area until we identify the central issues as transportation policy issues rather than foreign policy issues, as has implicitly been done so far.

On the plus side, we have been successful in working with the other agencies, using the Office of Management and Budget as a coordinator, in developing a new United

States Policy for the conduct of International Air Transportation Negotiations. All the agencies are now agreed on this policy. Now that the time has come to implement this policy, I believe that you should designate, in the near future, one focal agency to act as spokesman and to provide coordination and leadership for the Executive Branch.

We have problems today with the British in our continuing negotiations to try to obtain low air fares and liberal charter arrangements. In my view, the British are either in breach of the Bermuda 2 Agreement or that Agreement is not what you and I thought it to be when I signed it last summer. We are coming under Congressional pressure to exercise our right to serve the one year's notice required to terminate the Agreement. I am inclined to support this action if we do not make progress in our next two-week negotiating session with the British, which starts next week.

We also have problems with the Japanese, who are trying to limit our airline operations in Japan and who are also proposing an unjustifiably high increase in airport charges, which our airlines are faced with paying. France and Germany are posing problems for us in the area of charter air policy and new U.S. scheduled airline services. And the European Community in general is making every effort to keep out the innovative low fares that our airlines, with our support, are proposing.

I do not want you to conclude that these problems are the result of organizational inefficiencies and an inadequate interagency coordinating mechanism. But these problems persist and we appear to be slow in resolving them. I feel that their resolution is being delayed by the absence of an air transportation policy spokesman for your Administration.

So far, I have refrained from comment on this matter in order to give our people an opportunity to complete negotiations with Japan, the United Kingdom and other nations under present interagency arrangements (under a 1963 Presidential assignment) whereby the State Department is responsible for international aviation policy coordination. I have been reluctant to discuss aviation matters directly with Secretary Vance and Warren Christopher since both have removed themselves from international air negotiations because of their former airline industry connections.

There is growing Congressional concern over the issue of our international air transportation policy and the organization of the Executive Branch to carry it out. There are legislative initiatives being proposed in Congress to reduce or remove your power over Civil Aeronautics Board route and carrier recommendations in international air transport. We face hearings on these matters in both Houses of Congress this spring.

In addition, I am being contacted by the Ministers of Transport from other nations, the heads of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the heads of European airlines, and our own airlines. I meet with these people from day-to-day on problems of international air transportation. Time and again I hear the comment that more clarity is needed in statements about U.S. air transportation policy, and that no one knows who is the principal spokesman for the United States in the area of air transportation policy.

Today the U.S. Government is operating under a June 1963 letter from President Kennedy to the State Department assigning that Department a focal role in international aviation policy. For the stated reason that "international aviation policies necessarily affect our overall relations with other nations." In that letter, then President Kennedy said that he would "look to the Secretary of State, as part of his assigned responsibilities, to provide such a focus of leadership for this vital area of foreign policy."

This arrangement hasn't worked well. The Department of Transportation was formed in 1967 to coordinate transportation policies within the Executive Branch, but somehow this function was overlooked. The basic problem is that international air transportation deals with transportation and commercial policy issues rather than foreign policy issues, and the ad-hoc interagency committee chaired by the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs simply is not working. It has been cumbersome in its operation and has not effectively provided for resolution of inter-agency disagreements.

I believe it is possible for the Transportation Department to work with the State Department to assure that international aviation matters are viewed in the context of the overall relationship between foreign nations and the U.S. My Department has been able to coordinate the foreign policy and non-foreign policy views of the various agencies when assigned the responsibility for action on

major issues. In the case of the operation of the Concorde Supersonic Transport into U.S. airports, DOT successfully coordinated with State and NSC to assure that foreign policy considerations have been fully brought into the decisionmaking process. I would want this type of successful pattern of coordination to serve as a model for our future handling of international air transportation policy issues.

I believe that you should act now to assign leadership responsibility for international air transportation matters to the Secretary of Transportation. This would make the Department of Transportation the lead agency in negotiating international air transportation matters, in coordination with the State Department and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

I would be pleased to discuss this matter with you and the Secretary of State.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Other _____

cc:

Secretary of State Vance

Acting OMB Director McIntyre




THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

MAR 20 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Rick Hutcheson Staff Secretary
FROM: Brock Adams
SUBJECT: International Air Transportation Policy
Leadership

Two handwritten signatures are present to the right of the memorandum header. The first signature, for Rick Hutcheson, is written over the 'THROUGH' line. The second signature, for Brock Adams, is written over the 'FROM' line.

On March 6, 1978, I sent you a memorandum stating that I was "very concerned about the lack of clear assignment of policy and management responsibility for international air transportation within the Executive Branch." Since that time I have received from the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board copies of written communications to you in which they commented on my March 6 memorandum.

Cy and Fred have missed the thrust of my memorandum. I feel it would be helpful to you if I restated my position in light of their comments.

My first major concern is that there be a clear focus for presenting your transportation policy. The present situation in which so many agencies have equal voice in a policy group chaired by an Undersecretary at the State Department does not accomplish that objective.

As your principal transportation advisor, I believe I should speak for the Administration in these matters and represent U.S. policy concerns. By saying this I do not mean to imply that I must always be the negotiator. I would intend for the State Department to conduct most of the negotiations. However, I do believe that transportation policy decisions should rest with the Secretary of Transportation, who can best evaluate both substantive and political ramifications of various international aviation actions.

The State Department should, not as they do now, have the leadership role in formulation of transportation policies just because these policies happen to involve international aviation. If there are foreign policy reasons for changing or modifying a stated transportation policy, then the State Department's role should be to deal with those foreign policy reasons and to justify why they feel that such reasons should override the transportation policy basis for a position. Foreign policy concerns should not be dominant in this area, but should be subordinated to transportation policy. Organizational relationships should reflect this.

The CAB's role, in my view, should be much more limited than it is now. The Board is an independent regulatory agency and not a part of the Executive Branch. In making our transportation policy decisions we must have the Board available for its particular technical expertise in ratemaking and other economic regulatory matters that are strictly within their province. But I would seriously question the extent to which they should be involved in setting broad transportation policy for Executive agreements. Other agencies such as Justice, Commerce and CEA have limited roles which they have thus far performed satisfactorily.

The General Accounting Office just last week issued a report which found that there was a need for a more structured organizational approach to international aviation policy in the Executive Branch. That report concluded that the Secretary of Transportation should be the focal point for coordination of international aviation matters. The GAO reached this conclusion after full consideration of the roles of the other agencies.

International aviation organizations and members of Congress have told me that they do not know who to turn to in the Administration to express their concerns regarding our international aviation policy. I find, in particular, that I must bear the brunt of the concerns of Congress about international air transportation policy, but I lack the responsibility to make the decisions. The attached letters that I received last week are examples of these concerns. In my view, any assignment by you of direct responsibility in this area to any agency other than the Department of Transportation will continue the present confused situation.

In many other countries, the Transport Ministers hold primary responsibility for international air transport matters. Their Foreign Ministries have facilitating roles. Our awkward administrative arrangements in this country make it difficult to act decisively when action is required to advance the air transportation interests of the United States.

In summary, I believe it would be highly desirable for you to define as soon as possible the role you wish each agency to play in international aviation negotiations. Once these roles are defined, it would be a simple matter to set up the mechanism for the various agencies to carry out their assigned responsibilities effectively.

Attachments

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 16, 1978

Honorable Brock Adams, Secretary
Department of Transportation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am distressed to learn that the proposed agreement with the United Kingdom would grant that country part charter authority for a very questionable charter agreement, or perhaps for scheduled service.

I have been advised this will have a devastating impact and will eliminate the supplemental carriers from the market.

As you are aware, the Senate Commerce Committee has opposed the initiation of part charters in domestic service, and I would expect the same opposition with regard to foreign air transportation. Part charters in the hands of the scheduled carriers could be the demise of the charter specialists from the market.

The supplemental carriers must indeed be given greater authority, including scheduled service, to enable them to compete on an equal basis.

Sincerely,


HOWARD W. CANNON

HWC:da

HAROLD T. (BIZZ) JOHNSON
1ST DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE
PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION
CHAIRMAN

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICE ADDRESS:
2347 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DISTRICT OFFICE:
320 VERNON STREET
ROSEVILLE, CALIFORNIA 95678

March 17, 1978

The Honorable Brock Adams
Secretary of Transportation
Department of Transportation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:


I am distressed to learn that the proposed agreement with the United Kingdom would grant that country part charter authority for a very questionable charter agreement or perhaps for scheduled service.

I have been advised by constituents of my state that this will have a devastating impact and will eliminate the supplemental carriers from the market.

In view of these representations and the questionable nature of the agreement, it is requested that you withhold further action on the agreement and not, either initial or sign until such time as my committee through hearings can determine the correct course of action that should be taken.

I assure you that I will act expeditiously and schedule hearings at the earliest. In the meantime, should you wish to conclude arrangements with respect to scheduled matters pending between the United States and the United Kingdom, feel free to do so, provided you do not involve charters or part charters.

Sincerely yours,



HAROLD T. (BIZZ) JOHNSON
Member of Congress

HTJ:g



United States Department of Justice

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANTITRUST DIVISION

March 13, 1978

Mr. Rick Hutcheson
Staff Secretary
The White House
Ground Floor - West Wing
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Rick:

The Attorney General's Office has asked me to respond to your request on international air transport negotiations.

The Justice Department disagrees with the recommendation of assigning primary responsibility to the Department of Transportation for international air transportation matters, including bilateral negotiations.

The current interagency arrangement works fairly well since it combines expertise on foreign negotiations (State), rate and route matters (CAB), general transportation policy (DOT), and competition analysis (Antitrust Division, DOJ). DOT, on the other hand, has no particular role or special competence in the areas that are most important in international aviation negotiations: rates and routes. Any coordination problems that exist should be largely ameliorated by the new Policy for Conduct of International Air Transportation Negotiations, supplemented by mediation when needed by OMB and the White House Domestic Policy Staff.

Finally, to the extent the perception exists that DOT is currently less procompetitive than the CAB and that assignment of lead responsibility in this

DECLASSIFIED

Per, Rac Project

ESDN: NLC-126-12-32-1-3

BY KS NARA DATE 4/16/12




Mr. Rick Hutcheson
Page 2
March 13, 1978

area to DOT would be seen as reducing the relative influence of the CAB, adoption of the DOT recommendation could "send the wrong signal" on the Administration's commitment to aviation regulatory reform.

Let me know if I can be of further help.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John", with a large, stylized loop at the beginning.

John H. Shenefield
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division



United States Department of Justice

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANTITRUST DIVISION

March 13, 1978

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


Mr. Rick Hutcheson
Page 2
March 13, 1978

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Let me know if I can be of further help.

Sincerely yours,



John H. Shenefield
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division

WE URGENTLY NEED JOBS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR -- JOBS THAT CAN LEAD
TO USEFUL CAREERS -- AND I AM ASKING BUSINESS AND LABOR TO HELP IN THIS
EFFORT.

THIS WILL INVOLVE UNPRECEDENTED COOPERATION AT ALL LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE BUSINESS AND LABOR AS WE ESTABLISH PRIVATE
INDUSTRY COUNCILS TO DEVELOP LOCAL PROGRAMS.

(--NEW PAGE--)(I AM HAPPY TO NOTE . . .)

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
PRIVATE SECTOR JOBS INITIATIVE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT
MAY 23, 1978 5:00 p.m.

REUBEN¹
METTLER

WE ARE HERE TONIGHT TO BEGIN A NEW PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO EASE ONE OF OUR MOST DIFFICULT
PROBLEMS -- STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT.

WE URGENTLY NEED TRAINING AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE LARGE
NUMBER OF UNSKILLED MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE LEFT JOBLESS EVEN DURING
TIMES OF RELATIVELY LOW UNEMPLOYMENT.

(--OVER--)(WE URGENTLY NEED JOBS . . .)

I AM HAPPY TO NOTE THAT OUR REQUEST TO ESTABLISH THESE COUNCILS
HAS BEEN APPROVED BY FULL COMMITTEES IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND SENATE,
AS PART OF OUR C.E.T.A. REAUTHORIZATION BILL.

WE HAVE ALSO ASKED CONGRESS FOR \$400 MILLION FOR FISCAL YEAR
1979 TO FUND TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS THE COUNCILS
AND LOCAL C.E.T.A. OFFICIALS WORK TOGETHER.

(--OVER--)(ALONG WITH THE TARGETED TAX . . .)

ALONG WITH THE TARGETED TAX CREDIT SENT TO CONGRESS, THE
PRIVATE INDUSTRY COUNCILS WILL BE THE TOOLS WE NEED FOR A STRONG,
EFFECTIVE ATTACK ON THIS PERSISTENT PROBLEM.

WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH I HAVE ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO
CHAIR A HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE TO PROVIDE CONTINUING FOCUS AND
COORDINATION IN THE NATIONAL EFFORT TO REDUCE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT.

(--NEW CARD--)(THIS TASK FORCE WILL INCLUDE.)

THIS TASK FORCE WILL INCLUDE THE SECRETARIES OF EACH OF THE
MAJOR FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH DIRECT PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES: LABOR,
H.E.W., COMMERCE AND TREASURY.

AND IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, I HAVE ASKED THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE
OF BUSINESSMEN TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP WITH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.

(--OVER--)(THIS NEW PARTNERSHIP . . .)

THIS NEW PARTNERSHIP IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY EXEMPLIFIES OUR
ENTIRE URBAN PROGRAM: GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR WORKING
TOGETHER FOR THE COMMON GOOD.

BUT THE PROGRESS WILL ONLY BE AS SUCCESSFUL AS EFFORTS AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL MAKE IT.

I PLEDGE THE WHOLEHEARTED COMMITMENT OF MY ADMINISTRATION TO
CONTINUING
THE GOAL *x* OF PUTTING AMERICA TO WORK
#

5:00 PM
6:30 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*
BILL SPRING
SUBJECT: White House Event to Begin the
Private Sector Jobs Initiative

I. Background

My memo to you of April 14 indicated the importance of inaugurating our \$400 million Private Sector Initiative with a White House event. With your concurrence, we have scheduled a briefing and working dinner for Tuesday, May 23.

The briefing is scheduled to begin at 5:00 P.M. in the East Room with your announcement of the new jobs initiative (3-5 minutes). A text for this announcement is attached (Tab A). Following the announcement an hour long briefing on the details of the program will be conducted for the guests by Secretaries Kreps, Harris and Marshall; Assistant Secretary Ernest Green of DOL; Alan Kistler, AFL-CIO; and Reuben Mettler, President of TRW and Chairman of the National Alliance of Business. (Your participation is not expected for this portion of the event.)

The working dinner is scheduled from 6:30-7:30 P.M. in the State Dining Room. Guests will be seated at round tables and will be encouraged to discuss with the other participants their reactions to the new program. A discussion leader has been designated for each table. At the conclusion of dinner it would be appropriate for you to offer a few remarks, along the lines of those suggested in the attachment (Tab B), and then ask for a response from Reuben Mettler.

II. Participants

Those attending the event include representative leadership of the private sector, including large, small and minority businesses. Those who have been particularly supportive of the new program include:

- Dr. Richard Leshner, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce;
- Irving Shapiro, Chairman of the Business Roundtable;
- Wilson Johnson, President of the National Federation of Independent Businesses; and,
- Berkeley Burrell, President of the National Business League.

Those attending from labor include:

- Robert Georgine, President of the Building Trades Council;
- Glenn Watts, President of the Communications Workers;
- Patrick Greathouse from the UAW; and,
- Allan Kistler, President of the AFL-CIO Human Resources Development Institute.

Those guests representing minority and community organization interests include:

- Benjamin Hooks from the NAACP;
- Carl Holman from the Urban Coalition; and,
- Edward Morga, President of the League of United Latin American Citizens.

Also in attendance will be key Congressional leadership from the substantive committees including Senator Harrison Williams, Congressman Carl Perkins, and Congressman Augustus Hawkins.

Finally, the participants will include the chief elected officials from several states, cities and counties, among them:

- Coleman Young from Detroit;
- Kenneth Gibson from Newark;
- James Hunt from North Carolina; and,
- John Spellman from King County, Washington.

III. Press Plan

- Network coverage of the announcement
- Special picture with you and Lloyd Hand, President of NAB
- White House press briefing on Wednesday morning

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER

FROM GRETCHEN POSTON

DATE: 22 May 1978

SUBJECT: MEETING/DINNER RE PRIVATE SECTOR JOBS INITIATIVE

Please find attached the REVISED scenario for the function indicated above.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER

FROM GRETCHEN POSTON

DATE: 22 May 1978

SUBJECT: MEETING/DINNER RE PRIVATE SECTOR JOBS INITIATIVE
23 May 1978 5:00-8:00 P.M.
State floor

REVISED
SCENARIO
5:00 P.M.

All guests arrive Southwest Gate to East Room for seated meeting.
Exception: Platform speakers to be escorted to Red Room.

The PRESIDENT arrives State floor and proceeds to Red Room.

Platform speakers are escorted from Red Room to places on
platform - east wall/East Room. (Toe cards)

The PRESIDENT is announced into East Room. - proceeds to platform
and makes opening remarks.

(Press pens on either side of East Room door to
cover Presidential remarks.)

The PRESIDENT departs East Room.

Platform speakers are seated in front row.

(Press corps departs East Room.)

Meeting begins.

6:15 P.M. All guests depart East Room to Main Hall for refreshments.

(Pianist in Main Hall.)

6:30 P.M. The PRESIDENT and MRS. CARTER arrive State floor and proceed to
door of State Dining Room to welcome entering guests.

Dinner is served.

8:00 P.M. The PRESIDENT and MRS. CARTER depart State floor.

All guests depart Residence via Southwest Gate.

BUSINESS DINNER
23 May 1978
140 guests
6:30 P.M.

Cream of Mushroom Soup
Cheese Straws

Roast Rib of Beef

Yorkshire Pudding

Broccoli Spears

Praline Ice Cream Mold

Cookies

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT AWARDS
MAY 23, 1978

GOOD AFTERNOON. ONE OF THE CONSISTENT EFFORTS OF MY
ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF SERVICE OUR FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT PROVIDES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

EVERY ONE OF US HERE, AND EVERY ONE OF OUR ASSOCIATES AND
CO-WORKERS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT, HAS THE JOB WE HAVE BECAUSE THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT AND EXPECT US TO SERVE THEIR NEEDS.

(--OVER--)(WE ARE HERE FOR THAT PURPOSE,...)

WE ARE HERE FOR THAT PURPOSE AND THAT PURPOSE ONLY.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SERVICE THEY
HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM THEIR GOVERNMENT.

I FIND THAT DISSATISFACTION EVERY TIME I TRAVEL AROUND THE COUNTRY.
IT COMES AS NO SURPRISE TO ME.

AND I KNOW THERE ARE MANY DEDICATED PEOPLE IN THIS GOVERNMENT WHO
SHARE MY BELIEF THAT GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE CAN AND SHOULD BE IMPROVED.

(--NEW PAGE--)(THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND.....)

THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT WE CAN MAKE IS TO
REFORM THE CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM -- TO MAKE IT TRULY A MERIT SYSTEM THAT
REWARDS ACHIEVEMENT AND RESPONDS TO HUMAN NEEDS.

I TOOK THE FIRST -- AND MAJOR -- STEP TOWARD THAT IN MARCH, WHEN I
SENT TO THE CONGRESS THE FIRST PART OF MY CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROPOSALS.

I'M VERY PLEASED AT THE PROMPT ATTENTION CONGRESS HAS GIVEN THIS
LEGISLATION.

(--OVER--)(COMMITTEES IN BOTH THE . . .)

" COMMITTEES IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE HAVE HELD EXTENSIVE
HEARINGS.

THE SENATE BEGAN ITS MARK-UP SESSION THIS WEEK, AND WE EXPECT THE
HOUSE TO BEGIN QUITE SOON.

TODAY I AM SENDING TO THE CONGRESS THE SECOND AND FINAL PART OF MY
REFORM PROPOSALS: THE CIVIL SERVICE REORGANIZATION PLAN ITSELF.

(--NEW PAGE--)(IT CREATES AN . . .)

IT CREATES AN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT TO REPLACE OUR
ANTIQUATED AND UNFAIR HIRING PRACTICES WITH THE SAME KIND OF MODERN
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT THAT IS ROUTINE IN ANY EFFICIENT PRIVATE INDUSTRY.

IT CREATES AN INDEPENDENT MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD TO
SAFEGUARD THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND GIVES ACTIVE
ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO THOSE EMPLOYEES WHO "BLOW THE WHISTLE" ON
ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITY.

(--OVER--)(IT ALSO CREATES A . . .)

IT ALSO CREATES A FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE A
FAIRER AND MORE EFFICIENT WAY OF HANDLING LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.

CONGRESS HAS 60 DAYS TO CONSIDER THIS REORGANIZATION PLAN BEFORE
IT TAKES EFFECT.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT DESERVES CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, AND I THINK
WE WILL LOOK BACK TO THIS AFTERNOON AS THE BEGINNING OF A VERY SIGNIFICANT
CHAPTER IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

(~~NEW PAGE~~) (WE HAVE SOME PEOPLE HERE...)

WE HAVE SOME PEOPLE HERE TODAY, SOME VERY DISTINGUISHED GUESTS,
WHOSE PERSONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS SERVE AS A REMINDER OF HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE
ONE PERSON'S EFFORTS CAN MAKE, EVEN IN A SYSTEM, SUCH AS WE HAVE NOW,
SOMETIMES NOT
THAT IS HARDLY, CONDUCTIVE TO EXCELLENCE.

EACH OF THESE 11 GUESTS IS A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE WHO HAS MADE
EXCEPTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD IMPROVING GOVERNMENTAL ECONOMY AND
EFFECTIVENESS.

(--OVER--)(I'VE BEEN TOLD THAT . . .)

I'VE BEEN TOLD THAT IF YOU ADD UP THE SAVINGS TO THE TAXPAYERS
BROUGHT ABOUT BY JUST THESE 11 PEOPLE, IT COMES TO MORE THAN
\$13,500,000. > 550 others

AND THEY DID IT THROUGH PERSONAL IMAGINATION, PERSONAL DILIGENCE,
PERSONAL INITIATIVE.

WE HAVE SOME AWARDS TO PRESENT THEM WHICH THEY SURELY DESERVE.

(--NEW PAGE--)(BUT THE POINT I . . .)

BUT THE POINT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE -- AND I THINK THEY WOULD
AGREE -- IS THAT INSTEAD OF GIVING AWARDS ONCE A YEAR TO A FEW OF THE
MOST OUTSTANDING EMPLOYEES, WHAT WE NEED MOST IS A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM
THAT REWARDS GOOD PERFORMANCE DAY IN AND DAY OUT.

TODAY I WANT TO CONGRATULATE THESE PEOPLE WHO PERSONIFY THE
SPIRIT OF QUALITY PERFORMANCE THAT I AM DETERMINED TO EXTEND
THROUGHOUT OUR GOVERNMENT.

#